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Conway and Dhar  develop a model  to address  a  offset completely  the price impact  of dumping
theoretical  issue: what is the impact  of wide-  and return  the world  economy  to the predumping
spread  dumping and the use of antidumping  equilibrium. Rather,  when imposed  they act
duties  on the exporting  and importing  countries?  more as protective  policies to insulate  the
import-competing  sector  from competition  and
They  take as their null hypothesis  the  typical  as optimal  tariffs to improve  the purchasing
response  that dumping  is an unfair  trade practice  power  of all residents  of the importing  country.
and that appropriate  antidumping  duty restores  They do not end the dumping  because  they do
outcomes  obtained  through fair trade (the  not remedy  the root cause: market  segmentation
predumping  outcome). They compare  that to the  and the difference  in perceived  price  elasticity  of
altemative  hypothesis  that antidumping  duties  do  demand  in the two markets.
not eliminate  the distortions  to the world
economy  inherent  in dumping  behavior  but  * Although  dumping  is undertaken  by private
rather introduce  a protectionary  distortion  that  firms, it cannot  occur without  the cooperation  of
can further  reduce the welfare  of tradinl ,art-  the exporter  governnent. Both segmentation  of
ners.  foreign  from domestic  markets  and restrictions
on entry of firms are  necessary  to assure the
After indicating  analytizally  and through  profitability  of dumping. The former  can be
simulations  the impact  of dumping  behavior  and  guaranteed  through trade restrictions  on the re-
antidumping  duty retaliation  on exporting  and  import  of the dumped  good; the latter  may be a
importing  countries,  Conway  and Dhar conclude  component  of industrial  policy. Removal  of
that:  these  preconditions  will  eliminate  dumping.
* The credible  threat to impose  antidumping  *  Antidumping  quotas appear  to be an attrac-
duties promptly  and in an amount  equal to the  tive alternative  to antidumping  duties in attaining
dumping  margin can dissuade  exporting  firms  a fair trade outcome. In fact, they introduce  the
from undertaking  dumping  activity. But in-  possibility  of a third distortion  in the world
stances  of dumping  and the imposition  of  trading  economy  through their encouragement  of
antidumping  duties  indicat- that the duties  have  collusion  in the dumping  sector,  and are welfare-
failed at that task.  reducing  in comparison  with antidumping  duties.
Negotiated  export  restrictions  have similar and in
* The imposition  of antidumping  duties  does  some cases more pronounced  drawbacks.
not have the impact often assigned to it - to
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Enforcement  and of  Effects  on  Develovina-Countrv  Industries.Introduction
Dumping  occurs  when a firm  charges  a price  in the  foreign  market  below
its  price  in the domestic  market  when it supplies  the  identical  good to both
markets.' Provisions  within  the  GATT  allow  member  countries  to impose  anti-
dumping  (AD)  duties  to counteract  this  behavior  and  return  the  price  of the
dumped  goods  to its "fair  value". The increasing  incidence  of dumping
allegations  and  imposition  of anti-dumping  (AD)  duties  indicate  that  dumping
of exports  in foreign  markets  is a growing  concern  in international  trade  and
policy  discussions. The  other  studies  of this  volume  have presented  in quite
impressive  detail  the  evolution  and  present  ubiquity  of  AD investigations  and
duties  in import-competing  countries,  and  have also  addressed  the issue  of
whether  these  trends  truly  indicate  a rise in  dumping  activity. In this  paper
we focus  on a separate,  more theoretical  issue: what is the impact  of
widespread  dumping  and  use of AD duties  on the exporting  and  importing
economies?
A typical  response  to this  question  in  policy  discussions  has  been that
dumping  is an unfair  trade  practice  and  the appropriate  AD duty  restores
outcomes  obtainied  through  fair trade  (ie.,  the  pre-dumping  outcome). We take
this response  as our  null  hypothesis  and  compare  it to the  alternative
hypothesis  that  AD duties  do  not eliminate  the  distortions  to the  world
economy  inherent  in dumping  behavior  but rather  introduce  a protectionary
distortion  that can  further  reduce  the  welfare  of trading  partners.  This
latter  distortion  has  an impact  similar  to that of  protective  trade  policies
like tariffs  or quotas. Our  analysis  will first  examire  the  relevant
theoretical  evidence  on dumping  and  the incidence  of  AD duties. We focus  on
dumping  as a response  to segmentation  of domestic  from  foreign  markets,  the
so-called  "classic  theory  of price  discrimination"  (Deardorff,  1988,  24).
Then  we specify  an archetypal  computable  general  equilibrium  (CGE)  model in
which  dumping  is rational  firm-level  behavior  to compare  the  quantitative
effects  of  AD duties  on the  economies  relative  to the  effects  of both fair
trade (i.e.,  non-dumping)  and of other  protective  policies.Our analysis  indicates  that  while the  credible  threat  of Imposition  of
AD duties  can  maintain  the  world  economy  at a fair-trade  equilibrium,  actual
imposition  in response  to observed  dumping  is less  likely  to do so.  This
difference  hinges  on the distinction  between  Type I and  Type II  AD duties  made
in the  introductory  chapter  of this  volume. Type II  AD duties  are  those
imposed  immediately  to counteract  100  percent  of an observed  dumping  margin
and  removed  promptly  on the cessation  of dumping: a rational  firm  confronted
with an otherwise-profitable  dumping  opportunity  and these  AD duties  will
forgo  the  opportunity  and  fair trade  will be  maintained.
The  protectionary  distortions  of  AD duties  occur  when they are  in fact
imposed  in response  to observed  dumping. These  observed  duties  will have
elements  of Type  I AD duties: those  imposed  with less direct  temporal  or
sectoral  connection  to dumping  activity,  or that  counteract  only  a fraction  of
the  dumping  margin. These  will not dater  dumping  behavior,  and  will introduce
additional  relative-price  distortions  into  the  world trading  economy. The
relative  price  structure  in international  trade  and  in the exporting  country
with dumping  and  AD duties  will thus  be quite  different  from that  in the
absence  of dumping.
The  revenue  effects  of an observed  AD duty  provide  another  reason  that
the fair-trade  outcome  is not  maintained. When  AD duties  are imposed  in
response  to observed  dumping  behavior  on a substantial  share  of imports  the
resulting  revenues  from  the  duties  provide  a substantial  transfer  from  the
exporting  country  to the importing  country  that  will affect  economic  decisions
in both  countries. These  conclusions  together  suggest  that  the  null
hypothesis  will not  hold and  raise  the  possibility  that  the  net effect  of
dumping  and the  imposition  of  AD duties  will in fact  be quite  protectionist
for  the  importing  country. Simulations  with the  CGE  model  support  these
conclusions  and indicate  that the  protectionist  effects  of  AD duties  can  be
quantitatively  quite  significant.
AD duties,  whether  threatened  or imposed,  are  efforts  to regulate
international  trade. Other  possibilities  exist  for  such  regulation,  including
2imposition  of quotas  and  negotiation  of  voluntary  export  restraints. We
compare  and  contrast  the  quantitative  impact  of these  with that of  AD duties
using  data  from the  CGE  simuletions. We do not  consider  here  export
subsidies,  the  other  trade  practice  often  cited  as unfair  and  countervailable
under  the  GATT.  The  methodology  and tests  employed  here are  easily
transferable  to that case.  de  Melo and  Roland-Holst  (1990)  provide  a  useful
CGE  analysis  of the impact  of export  subsidy  on trade.
Given  its  reduced  welfare,  the  government  in the  exporting  country  may
well  want to reduce  the  barriers  that  allowed  market  segmentation  and  thus
remove  the rationale  for  dumping, We discuss  two  methods: trade
liberalization  to allow  dumped  goods  to be re-imported  at the lower  price,  or
an industrial  policy  liberalization  to encourage  firm  entry  into  the  dumping
sector. Either  will be successful  in stopping  dumping  at its  source,  although
the second  involves  an increase  in fixed  costs  in this  model that is itself
welfare-reducing.
Analytical  Discussion  of Dumping  and  AD Duties.
There  is a substantial  existing  literature  on economic  rationales  for
dumping. The  earliest  discussions  concluded  that  dumping  would  be profit-
maximizing  for  the  private  firm  if the  price  elasticity  of demand  is larger  in
absolute  value  in the export  market  than  in the  home  market  and if the  two
markets  could  be segmented  --  ie.,  prevented  from  cross-trading  with each
other. This "classic  theory"  was first  described  by Viner (1923)  and  Barone
(1921);  Robinson  (1933)  identified  it as discriminating  monopolistic  behavior.
More recent  analyses,  as discussed  below,  have incorporated  oligopoly  theory
with the  Viner/Robinson  insight  to explain  inter-industry  trade,  or  what
Brander  and  Krugman (1983)  call "reciprocal  dumping". Dixit (1987)  provides
another  analysis  of dumping  behavior  in an oligopolistic  setting. More
recently,  analysts  have advanced  other  theories  of dumping  as an intertemporal
phenomenon. Ethier  (1982)  and  Davies  and  McGuiness  (1982)  suggest  in this
vein that  dumping  as the sale  of products  below  average  or even  marginal  cost
can  be a  rational  response  to a temporary  downswing  of goods  demand.
3Williamson  (1977)  and  Areeda  and  Turner  (1978)  consider  predatory  dumping,
where temporary  dumping  below  average  or  marginal  cost can increase  the
discounted  value of total  profits. Dumping  in this  case drives  competitors
out  of the  market  and thus  permits  monopoly  pricing  in future  periods  that
increases  the discounted  value  of the  entire  stream  of present  and future
profits. We focus  on the  classic  theory  as expounded  in the  preceding
articles  in our  synopsis  of the  impact  of dumping  and  AD duties. We believe,
however,  that  a useful  extension  to this  work  would  be to  model similarly  the
intertemporal  theories  of dumping. The  following  conclusions  are restated  in
mathematical  form in  Annex  A.
Dumping  as a rational  reaponse  to market  segmentation
The  Viner/Robinson  insight  on dumping  behavior  is a simple  application
of the  microeconomic  theory  of price  discrimination.  Consider  a firm  with  no
competition  and  with purchasers  in  two  markets.  If there  is  no market
segmentation,  the  firm  cannot  discriminate  against  purchasers  in either
market;  sales  at a  higher  price  in  market  one  would  be undercut  by repurchases
from  buyers  in market  two, and  vice  versa.  Its  best strategy  is then  to set  a
unique  price  for the  two  markets  together  at a level  that  maximizes  its
profits. The price-setting  rule (or  equivalently  for our  purposes,  its
quantity  setting  rule that  generates  the  desired  price)  is the  3tandard
monopoly  condition  that  the  marginal  revenue  from  selling  an additional  unit
must equal  the  marginal  cost of  producing  that  unit.  Marginal  revenue  depends
upon the  price  elasticity  of demand  for  the  product  (A);  in this case  A is  a
weighted  average  of the  price  elasticities  of demand  in the  two  markets  (A,,
Ah). Price  exceeds  marginal  revenue,  with the  gap  between  the  two  narrowing
as demand  grows  more elastic  (as  the  price  elasticity  of demand  grows  in
absolute  value).
Viner,  Barone  and  Robinson  observed  that if the  two  markets  are
segmented  and the  price  elasticities  of demand  in the  two  markets  differ,  the
firm can  earn  even higher  profit  by setting  different  prices  in the  two
markets.  In this case,  the firm  should  set  the  marginal  revenue  in  market  x
4equal  to  marginal  cost  of production  and  the  marginal  revenue  in market  h
equal  to that same  marginal  cost.  If demand  is  more elastic  in  market  x, then
the  profit-maximizing  price  for  the identical  good  will be less  than the  price
charged  in  market  h.  If market  x is the export  market  while  market  h is the
home  market,  then  profit-maximizing  behavior  leads  to dumping. The  dumping
margin,  or the  percentage  difference  in the  two  prices,  will depend  upon the
difference  in price  elasticities  of demand.
More recent  analyses  of dumping  behavior  (e.u.,  Brander  and  Krugman
(1983),  Dixit (1988))  have  extended  this  insight  to the  case of oligopolistic
or  monopolistically  competitive  industries. In these  instances  the firm  must
consider  not only the  market  demand  elasticity  but  also the  share  of that
market  it  vill be able to capture  or retain  from  the  competition. The  profit-
maximizing  decision  is similar  to the  earlier  case for  both the  non-segmented
and  segmented  markets,  but the  marginal  revenue  in the criterion  is replaced
with a perceived  marginal  revenue. This  perception  reflects  the  firm's
perception  of each  market's  price  elasticity  of demand  to changes  in its  price
and  must incorporate  some  notion  of  how the  competitor  firms  will respond.
The interactions  of these  firms  can  be described  in a  number  of  ways, and  as
Eaton and  Grossman  (1986)  point  out the  results  obtained  may be sensitive  to
the  method  chosen. We choose  to employ  the  conditions  of a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium  with symmetric  firms,  and in this  case find  that  the firm's
perceived  price  elasticities  of demand  (6.,  6b)  are  related  to the  number  of
firms  competing  in the  market (nh,  n.)  and  to the  market  elasticities  (4, Ah)
in the  form 6t  - nrAQ,  i-h,x.' The  perceived  price  elasticities  thus  rise  both
with the  market  elasticities  and  with the  number  of competing  firms. These  6.
are  used  by the firm  in setting  prices  in the  two  markets,  and  when I6.1  >
I6b|  dumping  will occur.  Intuitively,  increasing  the  number  of firms  reduces
the  wedge  between  price  and  marginal  costS
Dumping  is  made possible  by two  preconditions: the opportunity  to sell
the same  good for  two  prices  in the  two  markets,  and a difference  in perceived
elasticity  of demand  in the two  markets. The first  must be a product  of trade
5policy,  for  without some  trade  restriction  the  trade  of goods  would  eliminate
this opportunity. The second  nay  be due either  to reasons  of  market  demand
differences  or to different  degrees  of competition  in the  two  markets.
National  welfare  is ambiguously  affected  by dumping  activity. Welfare
recruing  from  the dumping  sector  has two  components: the  consumer  surplus
from  domestic  consumption  and the  profits  earned  by producers  on domestic  and
foreign  sales. Part of the increased  profits  earned  by producers  is a
transfer  from  consumers,  and  will thus  not  be a net addition  to  welfare.  For
welfare  to rise  the increase  in profits  from  foreign  sales  must exceed  the
reduction  in consumer  surplus.
Welfare  in the importing  country  is improved  by dumping. Profits  for
the  import-competing  firms  fall  but  serve  as a transfer  to consumers  in that
country. The adled  increase  in consumer  surplus  from the  availability  of
lower-priced  imports  leads  to the  improvement  in  welfare.
The impact  of AD duties
The importing  country  is entitled  under the  GATT and  obliged  by law in
many countries  to impose  an AD duty  to counteract  the  effect  of dumping. Its
purpose  can  be outlined  by reference  to the  home (Ph)  and export  (P.)  prices
of the dumped  good  and the  resulting  dumping  margin (DM  - (Ph  - P.)/P.).  The
price  of the dumped  good in the  importing  country  is Pf,  and if the  real
exchange  rate  of the importing  country  is ef  the  following  relationship  links
these.
(1)  Ph  (I  +  DM)  P.  - Pf  /  ef
Given  this  relationship,  an AD duty equal  to  DM placed  on the  dumped  import
would raise  its  price  in the  importing  country  to efPb  and  remove  the
exporter's  advantage  in the  importing  market  introduced  by dumping.
This  does not  necessarily  return  the  world economy  to the  fair  trade
equilibrium,  because  it leaves  in  place  the fundamental  segmentation  of
markets  that  makes  dumping  possible. That  segmentation  allows  the  dumping
6firm  to set  its  prices  differentially  to  maximize  profits. This  point  is  most
clearly  made by considering  firm  behavior  when the  AD duty  is perceived  as
being  Type I due  to long  lags in implementation,  long  lags  in repeal  once
dumping  has stopped,  or un:ertainty  about  whether  AD duties  will be assessed
once dumping  begins. In this  instance  profit-maximizing  behavior  defines  a
strict  relationship  between  Ph  and  P.  that  can  be  written
(2)  P- - (1  +  ((b- 6X)/61(6b+1)])  P.
If  we compare  equations  (1)  and (2)  it is  evident  that  the  term in braces
defines  the  dumping  margin,  and its  components  are  not factors  that  are
reversed  by the imposition  of the  Type I  AD duty.  The firm  accepts  the  duty
as a cost of doing  business  independent  of its  dumping  activity  and as such  is
not deterred  from  dumping.
What then  does  the Type  I  AD duty do?  Since  it cannot  close  the  wedge
between  Ph  and  Pt  it  rather  will put  pressure  on Ph  and  P.  to fall,  on ef  to
fall (or  appreciate)  and  will provide  protection  for  Pf  to rise.  This  will
further  distort  the  relative  prices  in both economies  and in the  trade  between
the economies;  ie.,  it  will have the  customary  effects  associated  with
protective  tariffs.
At the  opposite  extreme,  the  threat  of a  Type II  AD duty is effective  in
maintaining  the  world economy  at its  fair-trade  equilibrium. 3 Beginning  with
no  market  segmentation  (our  definition  of fair  trade),  a rational  firm  faced
with the opportunity  of segmented  markets  and  the  threat  of a Type  II duty
will find  its  interests  best served  by maintaining  its fair-trade  behavior.
Any  move to raise  the  domestic  price  Pb to exploit  the  segmented  marketa  would
raise  Pg  in the  export  market  as  well, restricting  the  size  of that  market
without  passing  on the increase  in  price  through  the  export  price  P..  This
anticipated  loss  to the  exporting  firm  induced  by the  Type  II AD duty  causes
the firm  to revise  equation  (2)  and to conclude  that  it cannot  improve  upon  Pb
P  .a  at the fair-trade  equilibrium.
7AD  duties  thus  share  on  a smaller  scale  a  property  of  nuclear  weapons.
Threat  ef  their  use  can  induce  desirable  behavior.  However,  once  they  are
deployed  they  leave  existing  distortione  intatt  and  introduce  new  disasters.
This  independent  distortionary  effect  is  noted  in  the  economics  literature.
Deardorff  (1988,  27)  notes  in  his  survey  of  classic  dumping  that  "...it  vould
appear  that  restrictions  against  dumping  from  the  importing  country's  point  of
view  make  no  economic  sense.  This  conclusion  is  reinforced  if  one  considers
specifi.ally  the  welfare  of  the  importing  country."  Dixit  (1988)  finds  no
rationale  for  AD  duty  imposition  in  an  oligopolistic  version  of  the  classic
dumping  model.
AD  quotas,  voluntary  export  restrictions  and  negotiated  settlements
Given  the  problems  in  reattaining  the  fair  trading  outcome  through  use
of  AD  duties,  policy-makers  may  well  be  tempted  to  employ  an  AD  quota  of
imports  from  the  dumping  country  at  the  fair-trade  (ie., pre-dumping)  level.
Thi',  will  maintain  imports  at  the  fair-trade  level,  but  wi 1  not  remove  the
market  segmentation  and  the  incentive  to  dump. Setting  up  a single  quota-
holder  could  lead  to  positive  welfare  gains  for  the  importing  country,  but  the
more  likely  scenario  of  competition  among  importing-country  residents  to
import  under  the  quota  will  leave  most  of  the  profits  in  the  hands  of  the
exporting  firms.  This  would  lead  to  larger  diversions  from  the  fair-trade
outcome,  and  a  quantitative  example  is  presented  in  the  subsequent  simulations
section.  This  policy  therefore  retains  the  distortions  of  market  segmentation
and  of  protection  (as  evidenced  by  the  tariff-equivalent  of  the  quota).
An extreme  example  of  this  latter  effect  occurs  under  the  voluntary
export  restriction;  the  exporting  firms  will  in  this  case  capture  the  entire
profit  from  export  sales.  This  restriction  may  in  fact  encourage  collusion
among  the  competitors  to  such  an  extent  that  they  begin  to  act  as  monopolists
-*-  the  export  market.  This  would  lead  to  restrictions  of  exports  to  levels
lower  than  those  at  the  fair-trade  equilibrium,  since  the  number  of
competitors  would  be  reduced  to  nh+1,  and  the  resultant  higher  prices  in  the
export  market.4
8Negotiated  settlements  of  AD duty  cases  are  another  outcome  that the
theory  would  predict. Exporting  firms  unsure  of the  Type of AD duty  they face
(I or II)  would dump in  the  export  market. Once the  importing  country
threatened  a  Type II response  to the  dumping,  the exporting  firms  could  reach
agreements  leading  to a cebsation  of dumping  at a negotiated  price  in the
export  market. This could  be the fair-trade  price,  leaving  the  exporters  with
the  profits  incurred  until  the  Type II duty  was  imposed;  it could  also be a
higher  price  that  reflects  the  collusion  of the  exporting  firms  in  the
negotiation  process.
General-equilibrium  considerations
The discussion  to this  point  has  taken  as given  a number  of  variables
that should  more properly  be considered  endogenoue  in  a discussion  of the
effects  of dumping  and  AD duties. We mention  each  here,  but detailed  analysis
will be Dresented  in the  context  of the  simulation  model  and its  results.
Wages.  Dumping  tnat  expands  the  production  of its  sector  will put
upward  pressure  on  wages in  conditions  of full  employment. In cases  of less-
than-full  employment  the  cost function  should  include  the  shadow  wage, and
this also  will be rising. Dumping  need  not expand  the  production  in its
sector,  however;  concomitantly  with an increase  in sales  on foreign  markets
there  is a reduction  in sales  to the  domestic  market  due  to higher  Ph. The
net  result  on output  and  employment  is ambiguous.
Relative  prices  in other  sectors. Dumping  ia  a sector-specific
activity,  but through  its  impact  on national  income  and  factor  allocation  will
also  affect  prices  in other  sectors. This  will lead  to altered  demand  and
supply  decisions  in all sectors.
Income  effects  of  the  policy.  Dumping  will  change  the  allocation  of
income  both  within  and  across  countries. in the  exporting  economy  the
dumping-sector  profits  will rise  relative  to other  sectoral  profits  and to
wages; in the  importing  economy  the  converse  will occur. These  income  effects
will  change  demand  for  all  goods,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Additionally,  to
the  extent  that  the  winners  from  this  policy  have  different  consumption
9patterns  than  the  losers,  there  will be additional  shifts  in demand  due  to the
income  redistribution.
Other  government  policies. There  are two  sets  of policies  in the
dumping  country  that  generate  the  dumping  opportunity. Trade  policies  must
insulate  the  dumping  country  from the  importing  country;  otherwise,  goods
would  6  tmply  flow  back from  where they  were dumped  to the  home  market  at their
lower  price. Also,  industrial  policies  or other  barriers  must  protect  the
existing  producers  from domestic  competitiG.A.  Change  in either  of these  will
radically  alter  behavior  in the  dumping  sector  and  by extension  in the  economy
as a  whole.  This is evident  in the  derivation  underlying  equation  (2):
factors  that influence  the size  of the  6i  will influence  the size  of the
dumping  margin.  One  obvious  policy  change  is to remove  market  segmentation:
then all  firms  can  sell in all  markets (nh  - n.)  and  the  wedge  between  Ph and
P.  disappears. Another  is to allow  firm  entry  into  the  dumping  sector;  as  nh
becomes  large  it  apLrroaches  n.  even  though  market  segmentation  remains.
A CGE  Model  of Dumping  and  AD Retaliation.
In this section  we specify  a CGE  model  of international  trade  to
investigate  the  quantitative  impact  of dumping  and  AD duties  on the trading
economies  and  to compare  that  with the  impact  of protective  policies. This
model of three  trading  regions  is not calibrated  to represent  any  specific  set
of economies,  but rather  to provide  a quantification  of the  effects  of such
commercial  policies  within  a theoretical  trade  model.
The  model for  each  country  is  quite  similar  to other  CGE  models,
especially  those  inspired  by  World  Bank research  (see  Dervi;,  de  Melo and
Robinson  (1982)  or de Melo and  Tarr (1989))  although  with less sectoral
detail. Each country  is characterized  by  monopolistic  competition  in one
trading  sector,  and in that  we follow  the  work of Rodrik  and  Devarajan  (1989).
There  are,  however,  two  areas  in  which this  model  departs  sharply  from
the  existing  literature. First,  it is designed  "from  the  inside  out";  instead
of calibrating  the  model  to replicate  the  observed  behavior  of a specific
10country,  we begin as in trade  theory  with endowments,  technology  and tastes
and  have derived  the implied  behavior.
Second,  it endogenizes  the trade  pattern  between  the  three  regions. In
one  set  of simulations  we look  at two  of the  countries  in isolation,  so that
the  export  demand  relevant  to country  A is simply  the  import  demand  of country
B.  This  removes  a source  of possible  inconsistency  in  the other,  single-
country,  models  and  introduces  explicitly  the  game-theoretic  behavior  at the
base of retaliatory  commercial  policy  as discussed  here.' In the subsequent
simulations  we examine  trading  behavior  of these  two  countries  between  each
other  and  with a large  third  region  that  sets  world  prices. This
specification  of trading  patterns  is chosen  to approximate  more closely  the
incidence  of dumping  in countries  small  relative  to the  world  market.'
We present  the salient  features  of the  model in  Table  1.
There  are  three  goods  produced  and  consumed,  of  which two  are traded.
Of the two  traded  gooes,  one  is a decreasing-cost  industry. This  good is
denoted  T1; the  pattern  of endowments  assumed  of  productive  factors  implies
that  country  B is its  comparative-advantage  producer. Country  A has  the
comparative  advantage  in  a constant-cost  industry  producing  the good  T2.  The
large  world  region  is the  next lowest-cost  producer  of each traded  good.  Each
country  also  produces  a non-traded  good  NT.
The  production  and  demand  structure  of the  economies  generates  excess
demands  and  supplies  of traded  goods. With  no segmentation,  dumping  is  not
allowed  in equilibrium,  so that  the  export  price (P,)  equals  the domestic  sale
price (Pb). The dumping  equilibrium  is identical  to that  under fair  trade
except  that in country  B P,  is less  than  Ph. With Type  I AD duties  country-A
excess  supply  also shifts  down  so that  the  exchange  rate-adjusted  world  price
differs  from  both P,,  and  P¢ by the  amount  of the  intervention. There  would
of course  be shifts  in these  excess  supply  and  demand  curves  due to general-
equilibrium  effects  of policy  shifts,  and  we abstract  from  those  in the
diagram  for  clarity. They  are,  however,  captured  in the simulation  results.
11Consideration  of dumping  requires  assumptions  as  well about  the  form  of
market  segmentation  among  the  three  regions. The  Ti producers  of country  B
are  assumed  to be able to segment  both  domestic  and  country-A  markets  from
large-country  suppliers;  there  are  thus  three  different  prices  for  Ti, even
when converted  into  a common  currency. In equilibrium  the dumping  country
also  finds  it  profitable  to export  Ti at the  world  price  to the  third  country
and  imports  T2 in return. Country  A's  market  is closed  to resale  of Ti in the
third  country.
The  analytical  discussion  above  highlighted  the  importance  of the  number
of firms  competing  in  determining  the  dumping  margin  and  thus the
characteristics  of equilibrium  in the  world  economy. We specify  the
technology  of Ti production  to require  a fixed-cost  investment;  this
introduces  a rationale  for  monopolistic  competition  or oligopolistic  behavior
and a finite  number  of firms  supported  in each  market.  Such  decreasing-cost
technology  is not essential  to dumping,  but its  assumption  provides  an easy
way to compare  our results  with those  of  Brander  and  Krugman  (1983),  Dixit
(1988)  and others. In our  initial  simulations  we further  assume  that  Ti
production  is  limited  to  two  firms  in  each  economy.  The  number  of  firms
competing  in  each  market  will  differ  from  this;  with  no  market  segmentation
all  four firms  will compete  in each  country,  while  with  market  segmentation
the  competition  in  the  dumping  country  is  limited  to  the  two  home  firms (n%  -
2)  while  the  two  face  the  competition  of the  two  foreign  firms  in  their  export
market (nf  - 4).  In subsequent  simulations  we relax  these  assumptions  to
allow  for  firm entry  in the  dumping  sector  of the  Ti-exporting  country.
The results  that  follow  are  organized  by international  trading
structure: autarky,  trade  with no market  segmentation,  dumping,  dumping  cum
AD duty,  and equivalent  tariff  in the  absence  of dumping. Examination  of the
null and alternative  hypotheses  require  comparison  of the dumping/AD  duty and
equivalent  tariff  scenarios  with the  no-market-segmentation  scenario;  the
tables  making  that  comparison  are  thus  presented  in terms  of percentage
deviations  of variables  from  their  no-market-segmentation  values.  For  the
12null  hypothesis  to  hold, there  should  be no difference  between  the  no-market-
segmentation  and  dumping/AD  duty  scenarios. It is rejected  in favor  of the
alternative  if the dumping/AD  duty and  equivalent  tariff  scenarios  diverge  in
a systematic  way from  the  no-market-segmentation  case  with any  non-systematic
variation  attributable  to the  continued  phenomenon  of dumping. If they
diverge  in an  unsystematic  fashion  then  the  alternative  hypothesis  should  be
respecified.
Autarky
When the  two economies  are examined  in autarky,  they  reveal  the  desired
pattern  of comparative  advantage  as illustrated  in Table  2.  Country  B has the
lower  relative  price  of the  good  Ti and  country  A correspondingly  has  the
lower  relative  price  of T2. 7 The  profits  per firm in the  two  countries  in
the oligopolistic  Ti sector  are  17.83  in B and 15.47  in  A, respectively.
Trading  equilibrium
International  trade  causes  the  expected  changes  in sectoral  production
and income  structure  as indicated  in the  final  column  of Table  2.  Country  B
specializes  in  production  of Ti  while  country  A specializes  in T2.  The
returns  to the  relatively  abundant  factors  (K in  country  A, L2 in country  B)
rise,  while those  of the  relatively  scarce  factors  (L2  in country  A, K in
country  B) gall.  Relative  prices  of the  comparative-advantage  good  rise  in
each  country. Since  the  non-traded  good  is treated  as a  numeraire  in each
country,  trade  defines  a real  exchange  rate (ER/ERA)  relating  those
numeraires.
Country  A imports  18.99  units  of Ti and exports  23.53  units  of T2.
Trade  is balanced  between  the  two  countries. Welfare  rises  in  bcth countries.
GNP  measured  in units  of NT  proves  to be a misleading  indicator  of  welfare;  it
rises  by only .6  percent  in country  B and  in country  A falls  by 8.6  percent,
but  in both cases  purchasing  power  rises  by more due to the  fall in  the  price
of tradeable  goods.
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through  simulation  of trade  between  countries  A and  B alone. We now  create  a
large  third  region  with relative  prices  identical  to those  achieved  in this
equilibrium. Thus,  the  "fair  trade"  outcome  is one of trade  only  between  A
and B; one  measure  of the degree  to  which dumping  and  AD duties  bring  about
equilibria  different  from  this  reference  will be the importance  of trade  with
the third  region.
Dumping
The  earlier  theoretical  sections  demonstrated  that  a divergence  between
perceived  price  elasticity  of demand  in the  two trading  economies  will  provide
a rationale  for dumping. This divergence  is in evidence  in  the  present  model
in the  market  for  Ti; even  though  the  market  elasticity  of demand  is always
equal  to -1,  the  difference  in the  number  of competing  firms  leads  to a
perceived  foreign  elasticity  (6.  =  -4)  greater  in absolute  value  than  the
perceived  home  elasticity  (
6 h  - -2) for  producers  in country  B.  Table  3
illustrates  in its second  column  the  percentage  deviation  from  the  trading
equilibrium  resulting  from  dumping  in the  segmented  markets  in the  absence  of
an AD duty retaliation.
When market  segmentation  allows  thu export  price  to diverge  from  the
domestic  price  the  TI producers  in  country  B will create  a dumping  margin  of
.50  to  maximize  firm-level  profits. This  margin  is absorbed  by both domestic
consumers  and  foreign  consumers,  as the  consumer  price  of Ti rises  20.3
percent  in country  B  while  it falls  4.4  percent  in country  A.  This enables  Ti
producers  in country  B to increase  profits  per firm  by 14.1  percent.
The opportunity  to dump  does  not lead  to an increase  in output  of Ti in
country  B.  Although  exports  increase  with the  dumping  strategy,  domestic
consumption  falls  by more and  leads  to a 4.4  percent  drop in  Ti output. GNP
rises  in the dumping  country,  but  that is  an artifact  of the  artificially  high
price  of T1;  welfare  as measured  by actual  consumption  quantities  falls  by 3.3
percent  as losses  in consumers'  surplus  outweighed  profit-taking  in the
dumping  sector. Factor  prices  move  very little  in response  to the  decision  to
14dump;  there  is a slight  fall  in the  return  to  L2, the factor  used  intensively
in  production  of the  dumped  good,  in response  to the  cut in  production. The
lower  prices  of Ti in the foreign  market  also  bring  about  a 5.9  percent
depreciation  of the  country-B  real exchange  rate (ER/ERA).
The importing  country  receives  conflicting  signals  on the impact  of
dumping.  Measures  often  taken  as indicative  of the  effect  of dumping  on the
economy  vill indicate  a strongly  negative  impact. For example,  there  is
evidence  of "material  injury"  as required  for  retaliation  under  GATT  Article
VIs  imports  of the dumped  good  grow  by 15.8  percent,  and the  market  share  of
foreign  firms  in total  consumption  rises  from  41 to 45  percent. However,
these  give a  misleading  signal  of overall  welfare:  dumping  leads  to a 1.5
percent  increase  in  welfare  in country  A due  mainly  to the drop  in the average
price  of Ti.  There  is in fact  a slight  increase  in Ti production  and  profits
in the importing  country. The quantity  demanded  for  consumption  rises  faster
than exports  due to increased  purchasing  power. This is an artifact  of the
Armington  assumption  of imperfect  substitutability  between  the imports  and
domestically  produced  Ti and  understates  the  potential  for  material  injury.
Anti-dumping  duties
Given  the  clear  indication  of dumping  behavior  in  the  model  and the
"threat  of  material  injury"  evident  in imports  and  market  share,  country  A
would  be entitled  under  the  GATT (and  obliged  under  the  laws of  many
countries)  to impose  an AD duty  on country  B's exports  of Ti.
If the exporting  firms  perceived  country  A as credibly  committed  to
immediate  imposition  of a Type II  AD duty in  response  to dumping  then  the  duty
would have its  desired  effect. Simulation  of this case  would include  no price
discrimination  by the  exporting  firms  and  no imposition  of  AD duty  by the
importing  country  --  in other  words,  the  outcome  would  be identical  to that in
the  fair-trade  equilibrium  of column  1 in  Table  3.
However,  imposition  of a  Type  I AD duty  by country  A equal  to the
dumping  margin  generates  a new equilibrium  illustrated  by the  percentage
changes  listed  in the  third  columns  of Table  3.  (These  are  percentage  changes
15relative  to the initial  trading  benchmark.) These  simulations  make the  point
quite  forcefully  that  use  of the  AD duty  to retaliate  against  existing  dumping
does  not re-establish  the  pre-dumping  equilibrium. Dumping  will coexist  with
the  AD duty,  introducing  a second  distortion  to the  world trading  economy.
The degree  of dumping  may  be altered  or  not, as  noted in the  theoretical
section,  but the  end  result  is an outcome  with striking  protective  elements.
The  major impact  of the  AD duty  occurs  in its  effect  on international
trading  volumes  and  on the real  exchange  rates.  The  optimal  dumping  margin
remains  the same  at .50. Country  B's  export  of Ti to country  A falls  over  27
percent  relative  to its  initial  level,  while  exports  to the  rest  of the  world
rise from  zero  to 9.7  units.  Country  B's imports  from  country  A also fall  by
over  27 percent,  while imports  from the  rest  of the  world rise  to 12  units.
Country  B's real  exchange  rate  with  A appreciates  by 19.4  percent  relative  to
the  fair-trade  equilibrium. This  indicates  that  country  B's  purchasing  power
is enhanced  relative  to that of country  A.  Consumer  prices  of Ti in B rise  by
20.3  percent,  just as in the  case of dumping  alone,  while consumption  of Ti
there  falls  15.5  percent.
In the  dumping  country,  profits  per firm  fall in  NT numeraire  after  the
Type I duty,  but remain  12.8  percent  above  the  fair-trade  equilibrium  level.
The quantity  of Ti produced  falls  slightly  relative  to the  dumping  case.  GNP
falls  slightly,  and  welfare  improves  slightly,  relative  to the case  of dumping
alone.  The  AD duty  will thus  not discourage  the  profit-maximizing  producer,
but  will impose  a loss  on country  B through  the  terms-of-trade  deterioration.
In the  importing  country,  the  AD duty  provides  some  support  to Ti
producers: profits  per firm  rise  slightly,  as do output  and employment,  when
compared  to the  dumping  equilibrium. Despite  the  duty,  the  consumer  prices  of
Ti in  NT numeraire  fall  relative  to the  dumping  case  due  to the  real
appreciation  of the  country-A  exchange  rate.  There  is also  evidence  of the
Stolper-Samuelson  effect,  as the tariff  on imports  lowers  the  return  to the
abundant  factor  K.  The  net effect  on  welfare  of the  AD duty is negative,  with
16welfare  falling  below  that of the  ilitI,al  equilibrium  and  a fortiori  below
that  of the dumping  scenario.
The  general-equilibrium  effects  of dumping  and  AD duties  are evident  in
the  evolution  of the  other  tradeable  good  market. Dumping  alone  led  to an
increase  in T2 output  in the  dumping  country  and a fall in the  importing
country  in response  to substitution  away  from or into  Ti.  Trade  in T2 fell
relative  to the  non-dumping  case  because  of the lower  value of  Ti exports.
When the  AD duty is introduced  the  major  loser  is the T2 sector  in country  A;
output  falls  mainly  because  of the fall  in exports  to country  B.  The
government  income  from the  AD duty is rebated  to consumers,  and is sizeable  at
3.4  percent  of GNP.
Examination  of  Null and  Alternative  Hypotheses
We reiterate  our  null  hypothesis: that  dumping  cum  AD duty  returns  the
world economy  to the  pre-dumping  equilibrium. This is examined  relative  to
the alternative  hypothesis  that the  AD duty  works as a protective  duty in its
effects  on the importing  and exporting  economies  and does  not eliminate  the
distortions  due  to dumping.  A recurrent  theme  of this  volume  has  been the
manner  in  which  the  AD duty  provides  camouflage  for  the introduction  of
protection. In the final  scenario  documented  in Table  3  we consider  the
Impact  of a 50 percent  tariff  in  the  absence  of pre-existent  dumping. Given
the  existence  of a large  third  region  prepared  to provide  the  traded  goods  at
the  fair-trade  terms  of trade,  it is not  surprising  that  such a tariff  by
country  A on country  B's  goods  has  no effect  on the  two  countries'  domestic
economies. Its only  effect  is to greatly  stimulate  trade  with the  rest  of the
world,  with all trade  between  A and  B replaced  by trade  with the rest  of the
world.  The tariff  thus  collects  no revenue,  but  does  divert  trade  to the
third  market.
The  null hypothesis  holds  for  the  case of an anticipated  Type II duty.
As  we noted in the  text,  the  equilibrium  resulting  from  marker  segmentation
17and  a credible  Type II AD duty is identical  to that  of fair  trade  in this
model.
In the  case of Type  I duties  examination  of the  third  column  of Tables  3
indicates  that  the  null hypothesis  does  not hold.  The  dumping/AD  duty
scenario  maintains  large  deviations  in a  broad  array  of  variables  from  their
values  in the  non-segmented  trading  equilibrium. The  Type I  AD duty  cannot
affect  the terms  of trade,  and  has less  impact  on the real  exchange  rate,  but
nevertheless  worsens  in  most cases  the swings  in  variables  away  from their
trading  equilibrium  due to dumping.
The alternative  hypothesis  that  an  AD duty  is simply  a targeted
protective  tariff  does  not  help to explain  the  domestic  distortions  in
countries  A and  B in the  dumping/AD  duty  equilibrium,  but its  evidence  of
trade  rerouting  does  provide  an explanation  for  the rapid  growth  in trade  with
the rest  of the  world.  The observed  dumping/Type  I  AD duty  equilibrum  is  thus
marked  by characteristics  both of  protection  and  of the  dumping  margin
maintained  by the  exporting  country.
Figures  1  through  3 reiterate  the  lessons  of this  hypothesis  test.  In
Figure  1 the  welfare  effects  of dumping  and  AD duties  are  summarized  for  the
two trading  economies  separately  as  well as jointly. There  are  large  gains
from  trade  in the  move from  autarky  to fair  trade. Dumping  reduces  joint
welfare,  although  the importing  country  wins big and  the dumping  country  loses
big from  that  activity. Imposition  of the  Type  I AD duty  brings  about  a still
further  fall in  joint  welfare,  with the  importing  country  losing  from  its  AD
duty imposition  while the  dumping  country  gains.
Why does  country  B dump  these  goods  if it  reduces  its  welfare? Figure  2
illustrates  the  reason  in the  changes  in  profits  of TI-producers  in the  two
countries. Fair  trade  leads  to an improvement  in  profite  in country  B
relative  to autarky,  and to a precipitous  decline  in profits  in country  A.
Dumping  further  improves  firm-level  profite  in country  B,  while the  imposition
of  AD duties  has a slight  negative  impact  there. Country-A  profits  are  little
affected  by either  of these  innovations.
18These  changes  in commercial  policy  have a large  impact  on the  volume  and
pattern  of trade. Figure  3 illustrates  these  changes  through  examination  of
the  pattern  of exports  of Ti by country  B.  Fair  trade  brings  about  a large
expansion  in exports  to country  A, while (by  construction)  exports  to the  rest
of the  world remain  at zero.  The  market  segmentation  that leads  to dumping
increases  the  volume  of trade  in  Ti,  and  also opens  up some shipment  to the
rest  of the  world.  Imposition  of the  AD duty leads  to a large  shift  in the
pattern  of trade,  with  much  more exported  to the  rest  of the  world,  and  a  much
smaller  effect  on export  volume.
AD duties  vs. AD quotas  in restoring  the initial  trading  outcome
Recent  theoretical  research  has  suggested  that  quotas  and  tariffs  will
lead  to different  trading  equilibria  even  though  they  are  specified  to provide
identical  partial-equilibrium  protection. For example,  Syropoulos  (1990)
demonstrates  that in a dynamic  setting  quotas  can  be pro-competitive  while
tariffs  do  not have that  effect. The  key to that  paradoxical  result  is the
impact  of the  policy  on  market  structure;  in  Syropoulos'  case  the  quota  leads
to  greater  competition  among  foreign  exporters. Evidence  on "quality
upgrading"  in  US imports  suggests  that  quotas  will on the  contrary  have  an
anti-competitive  effect  that  tariffs  will not  due  to reduced  competition  among
foreign  exporters.
We examine  the  difference  in impact  of tariffs  and  quotas  in our
simulation  model.  The  tariff  that  is  purported  to restore  fair  trade  is that
equal  to the dumping  margin;  the quota  with equivalent  effect  will limit
imports  to the  pre-dumping  quantity. Results  of simulations  that  compare
these  two  policies  are  presented  in  Table  4.
With the imposition  of the  quota  the  profit-maximizing  condition  of the
dumping  firm is changed,  and  the  new condition  will depend  upon  the  effect  of
imposition  of the quota  on expectations  of  competition. Many alternative
assumptions  about  this  are  possible;  we assumed  that  with the  quota  the
exporting  firms  viewed  tLemselves  as the  only  competitors  in the  quota-limited
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market  and led  to identical  domestic-currency  pricing  decisions  for  the  two.
The third  column  of Table  4 indicates  the  effects  of this  quota  in the  CGE
model.  The  price in  both  markets  was set  at the  monopolistic  price  of the
domestic  market. The dumping  country  B found  the  quota  preferable  to the  AD
duty in terms  of  welfare. The importing  country  A would  have achieved  the
desired  result  of eliminating  evidence  of dumping,  but  will suffer  a  welfare
loss relative  both to fair trade  and  to the  AD duty.
The quota  is set  at the fair-trade  equilibrium  level.  It  proves  to be
non-binding  in the  new equilibrium,  as the  exporting  firms  choose  to export
less than  permitted,  but  at a  higher  price.  In the  theoretical  section  we
discussed  the  anti-competitive  incentives  of quotas,  and these  results
illustrate  that  concept. Firm-level  profits  rise sharply  in country  B
relative  to the fair-trade  level,  while firm-level  output  and  profits  in the
importing  country  fall.  Thus,  although  some indicators  of injury  in the
importing  country  --  the  increased  exports  and loss  of  market  share  --  are
reversed  by the  quota,  other  more important  indicators  of injury  appear.
Negotiated  voluntary  export  restrictions  (VER)  carry  the  anti-
competitive  nature  of quotas  another  step. With the quota,  there  is still
some  competition  among  exporting  firms  in the  export  market,  while  with a VER
there  is an incentive  for  those  exporters  to collude  in choosing  a
monopolistic  price  and  quantity  for  export. We model  this  by maintaining
market  segmentation  and  using  numerical  optimization  of the  model  to choose
the  price  on exports  that  maximized  firm-level  profits. The resulting  AD VER
scenario  is characterized  by reverse-dumping,  with an export  price  exceeding
the  domestic  price.  This  results  from  the  competition  among  two firms  in the
domestic  market  but the  collusion  --  implicitly  a monopolistic  firm  - in the
export  market. The effects  of the  AD quota  on the  importing  country  are
intensified  by this,  and  consumer  prices  of Ti rise above  the levels  reached
with the  AD duty in  place.  Producers  of Ti in the importing  country  lose  both
through  lower  production  and  lower  profits  while  the  nation  as a  whole
20experiences  a large  fall  in  welfare.  In country  B the  reverse  holds,  with
output  and  profits  in the  Ti sector  rising. Welfare  in country  B in fact
rises  above  its  fair  trade  level  as it exploits  its  monopoly  power  in the  TI
market  due to the  market  segmentation.
The  net  result  of these  alternative  forms  of anti-dumping  regulation is
an improvement  in exporter-country  welfare  and  reduction  in importer-country
welfare  relative  to the  AD-duty  scenario  and less  support  to import
competitors  than in the  AD-duty  scenario.
An Extension: The Impact  of Trade  on Market  Structure
The  preceding  results  were predicated  upon  a fixed  number  of firms  in
each  economy. In the  absence  of government  restrictions  to entry,  this
rigidity  would  not in general  hold,  especially  in the  presence  of super-normal
profits  in the  Ti sector. An alternative  assumption  would  be to let  entry
occur  until  those  profits  were eliminated,  and  we investigate  that  possibility
in this section.
The first  variant  we explore  is the  possibility  that  the  number  of firms
in  the dumping  country  is fixed  while  the  number  in the importing  country  is
not.  In the  short  run  trade  and a fortiori  dumping  should  lead  to losses  by
the  firms  in the  importing  country;  in the  longer  run  the  number  of firms
should  shrink  to reflect  the  new  realities. As the  first  panel  of  Table  5
illustrates,  the trading  equilibrium  leads  to a  marginal  shrinkage  of the
number  of firms  in country  A from  the  autarkic  2 to 1.66.  Subsequent
introduction  of dumping,  AD duties  and  equivalent  tariffs  have  very small
effects. The impact  on the  variables  discussed  in the  previous  section  is
also quite  small,  with  welfare  rising  slightly  in this  long-run  equilibrium  as
fewer  fixed  costs  are  incurred.
A second  simulation  illustrates  the  importance  of government
restrictions  on entry  into  the  Ti sector  in  country  B.  The  fixed  costs  of
production  in the  TI sector  serve  as a barrier  to entry  in  both countries;
however,  they are  not  the  binding  barrier  in country  B in the  preceding
21simulations. If entry  is allowed  to  bid profits  to zero,  the  market  structure
changes  markedlys in  place  of the 2 firms  in country  B and  2 in country  A,
the  market  supports  6.5  firms  in  country  B and  3.67 firms  in country  A.8
This  change  in  market  structure  has an ambiguous  effect  on  welfare.  The
increase  in the  number  of firms  narrows  the  wedge between  price  and  marginal
cost  in Ti production,  and  thus lowers  the  efficiency  loss.  However,  the
increase  in  the  number  of firms  leads  to an increase  in  outlays  for  fixed
costs;  as these  do  not directly  increase  consumption  they  reduce  welfare.  In
the scenarios  with nh  - 2, the output  of Ti per firm  was 34.47  in  country  B;
with free  entry  and  nb  - 6.5,  the output  per  firm  becomes  11.67. Welfare  in
country  B falls  by 4.55  percent,  while  welfare  in country  A rises  by 1.23
percent  through  the fall  in Ti prices  due  to competition.
There  are  two important  conclusions  we draw from  these  results. First,
if country  B  maintains  the  trade  barriers  that  segmented  the  two  markets  in
the  previous  example  there  will be less  dumping. The difference  in  perceived
trade  elasticities  has shifted  and  has lessened  dumping's  profitability.
Second,  free  entry  is an expensive  way to eliminate  dumping. The fixed  costs
incurred  lead to an unnecessary  fall in  welfare.
Conclusions
We have indicated  both in analytical  form  and through  simulations  the
impact  of dumping  behavior  and  AD duty  retaliation  on the  exporting  and
importing  country. We draw  the following  conclusions:
--  the  credible  threat  to impose  anti-dumping  (AD)  duties  promptly  and
in amount  equal  to the  dumping  margin  can  dissuade  exporting  firms  from
undertaking  dumping  activity. Observance  of dumping  and imposition  of  AD
duties  indicates,  however,  that  the  duties  have failed  at that  task.
--  imposition  of AD duties  does  not  have the  impact  often  assigned  to
it, i.e.  to offset  completely  the  price  impact  of dumping  and return  the  world
economy  to the  pre-dumping  equilibrium. Rather,  when imposed  they act  more as
protective  policies  to insulate  the  import-competing  sector  from  competition
22and  as optimal  tariffs  to improve  the  purchasing  power  of all  residents  of the
importing  country. They do not  end the  dumping  because  they  do not remedy  the
root  cause:  the  difference  in perceived  price  elasticity  of demand  in the  two
markets  and the  market  segmentation.
--  although  dumping  is undertaken  by private  firms,  it cannot  occur
without  the cooperation  of the  exporter  government. Both segmentation  of
domestic  from  foreign  markets  and  restrictions  on entry  of firms  are  necessary
to assure  the  profitability  of dumping. The former  can  be guaranteed  through
trade  restrictions  on the re-import  of the  dumped  good,  while the  latter  may
be a component  of industrial  policy. Removal  of these  preconditions  will
eliminate  dumping.
--  AD quotas  appear  to be an attractive  alternative  to  AD duties  in
attaining  a fair  trade  outcome. In fact,  they  introduce  the  possibility  of a
third  distortion  in the  world  trading  economy  through  their  encouragement  of
collusion  in the  dumping  sector,  and  are  welfare-reducing  in simulations  in
comparison  with  AD duties. Negotiated  export  restrictions  have similar,  and
in some  cases  more pronounced,  drawbacks.
Our conclusions  are drawn  from  the theoretical  and  simulation  results  of
this  paper,  and as such  are  model-specific.  We have  performed  sensitivity
analysis  with important  parameters  and  obtained  qualitatively  identical
results,  but encourage  further  work to establish  their  generality. As the
companion  papers  of this  volume  demonstrate,  the  allegations  of dumping  and
imposition  of anti-dumping  duties  has  not  diminished  in recent  years;  it is
important  to recognize  their  true  general-equilibrium  implications  when
considering  perpetuating  that  trend.
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24Table  1  Features  of the CGE  Simulation  Model
--  There  are  two countries: A and  B.
--  There  are  three  factors  of production: capital  (K),  unskilled  labor
(L2)  and  skilled  labor (Li).
--  There  are  three  sectors: an increasing-returns  tradeable  (T1),  a
constant-returns  tradeable  (T2)  and  a non-tradeable  (NT).
--  B has equal  endowments  of the three  factors,  while  A has  a
preponderance  of K and  a shortage  of L2.
Country  B  Country  A
Li  200  200
L2  200  300
K  200  100
--  The  production  technology  is Cobb-Douglas  and  identical  in each
country. The income  shares  of the  three  factors  in  production  of the  three
goods  is
Li  K  L2
Ti  .2  .2  .6
T2  .2  .6  .2
NT  .6  .2  .2
--  Demand  for the  goods  is  Cobb-Douglas  and  identical  in each country;
shares  of income  spent  on the  three  goods  are:  Ti .3,  T2 .4,  NT .3.
--  These  parameters  are  chosen  so that  B is relatively  well ondowed  in
those  factors  intensive  in Ti production,  while  A is relatively  weil endowed
in the factors  intensive  in T2 production. The  relative  prices  of the  two
goods  in autarky  lead  to A's export  of T2 and  B's export  of Ti.
--  The imported  good is combined  with the domestic  good of the same  name
in an  Armington  CES  composite  consumption  good.  This  function  takes  the  form
(for  country  B) of
CD  - AM*(BM*IMPc  +  (I-BM)*DS")(C"')
with CM - (SIGM-1)ISIGM  and SIGM  the  substitution  elasticity  between  domestic
(DS)  and  foreign  (IMP)  goods  in  composite  demand  (CD). Parameter  values  are:
Country  B  Country  A
AM:  Ti  1.00  1.89
T2  1.69  1.00
DM:  Ti  --  0.30
T2  0.24  --
SIGM:  Ti  --  1.20
T2  1.20  __
The  AM and  BM parameters  were calculated  to fit  the  initial  conditions  on
prices  and  quantities  that  generated  20 units  of  Ti export  by country  B and  20
units  of T2 export  by country  A.  Country  B's exports  are  constrained  to equal
country  A's imports,  and  vice  versa  in the two-country  scenario in the three-
country  scenario  only  overall  balance  is required.
25--  Imperfect  competition  is introduced  by considering  Ti to require  an
initial  cost  denominated  in factors  of production  to begin  production. These
initial  factors  are assumed  used in the  proportions  of directly  productive
factors,  and are  assumed  to be 10  percent  of the  factor  use in Country  B (the
lower-opportunity  cost supplier  of T1).
The  number  of firms  is derived  endogenously  to be consistent  with that
degree  of barrier  to entry  under  the  assumption  of Cournot  behavior.
An initial  simulation  using  country  B in autarky  is run  to define
simultaneously  the  number  of firms  in operation  and  the fixed  cost  per firm  in
units  of factors  of production. The  results  are:
N - 2.0;  FIXL1  - 1.136;  FIXK =  1.000;  FIXL2  - 4.167
That fixed  cost is then  presumed  necessary  for  a firm  in either  country
wishing  to produce  Ti.  Its  pricing  is oligopolistic,  thus  allowing  super-
normal  profits (also  derived  endogenously).
--  Welfare  is  measured  in each  economy  by a Graham-Mill  welfare  function
(Cobb-Douglas  in form)  using  the  consumption  quantities  derived  endogenously
and the  consumption  shares  given  above.
26Table  2  Autarky  and  Trade:  Indications  of Comparative  Advantage  and  Welfare
Autarky  Fair  Percentage
Trade  Increase
Country  B:  the exporter  of TI
Output
Ti  43.48  68.83  58.30
T2  101.66  77.53  -23.73
NT  80.24  80.72  0.60
Profit/firm  17.83  19.45  9.09
Consumption
Ti  43.48  49.84  14.62
T2  101.66  100.80  -0.85
NT  80.24  80.72  0.60
GNP  267.48  269.07  0.59
Consumer  prices
Ti  1.85  1.62  -12.43
T2  1.05  1.07  1.90
NT  1.00  1.00  0.00
Marginal  cost in  production
Ti  0.92  0.98  6.52
T2  1.05  0.99  -5.71
NT  1.00  1.00  0.00
Factor  Prices
Li  0.39  0.39  0.00
L2  0.32  0.38  18.75
K  0.45  0.38  -15.56
Welfare  73.39  76.34  4.02
Indicators  of comparative  advantage
Relative  price  of Ti:  1.76
Relative  marginal  coat  of Ti:  0.88
Country  A:  the imnorter  of Ti
Output
Ti  30.31  28.10  -7.29
T2  112.10  122.18  9.00
NT  75.14  68.70  -8.57
Profit/firm  15.47  2.54  -83.58
Consumption
Ti  30.31  46.28  52.68
T2  112.10  98.65  -12.00
NT  75.14  68.70  -8.57
GNP  250.46  229.02  -8.56
27Consumer  prices
Ti  2.48  1.48  -40.32
T2  0.89  0.93  4.49
NT  1.00  1.00  0.00
Marginal  cost in production
Ti  1.24  1.25  0.08
T2  0.89  0.93  4.49
NT  1.00  1.00  0.00
Factor  Prices
Li  0.37  0.36  -2.70
L2  0.63  0.62  -1.59
K  0.28  0.30  7.14
Welfare  67.15  70.53  5.03
Indicators  of comparative  advantage:
Relative  price  of Ti:  2.79
Relative  marginal  cost  of Tl:  1.39
Characteristics  of the  Trading  Equilibrium
World  Prices  Goods  Trade
Ti  1.36  Ti  18.99





Simulations  using  a third  large  country  were calibrated  to yield  results
identical  to those  reported  in  the second  column  of this  table.
28Table  3  General-Equilibrium  Impact  of Dumping  and  t!etaliatory  Tariffs
Two  countries  facing  the rest  of the  world
(Fair  Trade  benchmark  in levels;  other  entries  in percent  changes)
Fair  Dumping/  Equivalent
Trade  Dumping  AD Duty  Tariff
Country  B:  exporting  Ti
---------------------------------------------------------------- __------
Outnut
Ti  68.83  -4.37  -4.75  0.00
T2  77.53  2.00  2.50  0.00
NT  80.72  1.76  1.59  0.00
Profit/firm  19.45  14.13  12.80  0.00
Consumption
Ti  49.84  -15.40  -15.49  0.00
T2  100.80  2.98  6.52  0.00
NT  80.72  1.76  1.59  0.00
GNP  269.09  1.75  1.58  0.00
Consumer  prices
TI  1.62  20.32  20.32  0.00
T2  1.07  -1.40  -4.86  0.00
NT  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Factor  Prices
LI  0.39  0.51  0.51  0.00
L2  0.38  -2.39  -2.39  0.00
K  0.38  0.52  0.78  0.00
Dumping  Margin  0.00  0.50  0.50  0.00
Welfare  76.34  -3.26  -2.03  0.00
Country  A:  importing  Ti
---  --------------------------------------------------------------------
Output
TI  28.10  0.82  1.10  0.00
T2  122.18  -0.27  -2.09  0.00
NT  68.70  0.03  2.88  0.00
Profit/firm  2.54  1.77  1.81  0.00
Consumption
Tl  46.29  4.95  -7.96  0.00
T2  98.65  0.10  3.97  0.00
NT  68.71  0.02  2.87  0.00
GNP  229.02  0.02  -0.55  0.00
Consumer  prices
Ti  1.48  -4.39  12.09  0.00
T2  0.93  0.11  -0.86  0.00
NT  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
29Factor  Prices
Li  0.36  -0.28  -1.11  0.00
L2  0.63  -0.16  -0.63  0.00
K  0.30  -0.67  -4.67  0.00
Tariff/Duty  0.00  0.00  0.50  0.50
Income  transfer  0.00  0.00  -3.40  0.00
Welfare  70.53  1.51  -0.08  0.00
International  Indicators
World  Prices
Tl  1.37  0.00  0.00  0.00
T2  1.10  0.00  0.00  0.00
NT  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Exchange  Rates
ER  1.19  -5.71  -20.08  0.00
ERA  0.84  0.24  -0.71  0.00
World  price:
dumped  goods  1.16  1.37  1.37
Goods  trade (B  to  A):
Ti  18.99  15.85  -27.48  -100.00
T2  23.53  -1.79  -27.51  -100.00
Trade  with rest of  world:
Country  B
Exports  0.00  1.66  9.67  18.99
Imports  0.00  1.98  11.97  23.53
Country  A
Exports  0.00  0.00  0.00  23.53
Imports  0.00  0.00  0.00  18.99
30Table  4  General-Equilibrium  Comparison  of Anti-dumping  Duties  and Quotas
Two countries  facing  the  rest  of the  world
(Fair-trade  benchmark  in levels;  other  entries  in percent  changes)
Fair  AD  AD  AD
Trade  Duty  Quota  VER
Country  B:  exporting  Ti
Output
Ti  68.83  -4.75  -11.16  -17.23
T2  77.53  2.50  4.66  7.25
NT  80.72  1.59  4.79  7.24
Profit/firm  19.45  12.80  38.41  57.75
Consumption
Ti  49.84  -15.49  -11.28  -7.76
T2  100.80  6.52  3 `8  7.16
NT  80.72  1.59  4..  :)  7.24
GNP  269.09  1.58  4.78  7.23
Consumer  prices
TI  1.62  20.32  18.08  16.24
T2  1.07  -4.86  0.56  0.00
NT  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Factor  Prices
Li  0.39  0.51  1.80  2.56
L2  0.38  -2.39  -6.58  -9.47
K  0.38  0.78  2.10  2.89
Dumping  Margin  0.00  0.50  0.00  -0.37
Welfare  76.34  -2.03  -0.62  2.46
Country  A:  importing  TI
---------------------------------------------------------------- __------
output
Ti  28.10  1.10  -0.68  -3.10
T2  122.18  -2.09  0.21  1.02
NT  68.70  2.88  0.00  0.09
Profit/firm  2.54  1.81  -1.97  -7.87
Consumption
Ti  46.29  -7.96  -3.70  -16.07
T2  98.65  3.97  -0.08  -0.36
NT  68.70  2.87  0.00  0.09
GNP  229.02  -0.55  -0.02  -0.09
Consumer  prices
Ti  1.48  12.09  4.12  19.39
T2  0.93  -0.86  0.00  0.00
NT  1.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
31Factor  Prices
LI  0.36  -1.11  0.00  0.00
L2  0.63  -0.63  -0.63  -0.48
K  0.30  -4.67  0.00  0.00
AD Duty  0.00  0.50  0.00  0.00
Income  transfer  (1  of GNP)  0.00  3.40  0.00  0.00




Ti  1.37  0.00  0.00  0.00
T2  1.10  0.00  0.00  0.00
Exchange  Rates
ER  1.19  -20.08  3.36  0.25
ERA  0.84  -0.71  0.36  0.60
Goods  Trade (B  to A)
Ti  18.99  -27.48  -10.85  -42.08
T2  23.53  -27.51  1.40  6.75
Trade  with the  rest  of the  world (levels):
Country  B
Exports  0.00  9.67  0.00  0.00
Imports  0.00  11.97  0.00  0.00
Country  A
Exports  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Imports  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
32Table  5  Dumping,  AD Duties  and  Market  Structure
(number  of firms  such  that  ir  0)
For  given  structure  in dumping  country  (nh  8  2):
nI
Trading  equilibrium  3.66
Dumping  equilibrium  3.68
Dumping/AD  duty  equilibrium  3.68
Equivalent  tariff  equilibrium  3.66
Variable  market  structure  in both  countries:
n.  n.
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37Annex  A
A Mathematical  Statement  of  Dumping/AD  Duty  Behavior
Dumping
We begin  with a restatement  of the  Viner-Robinson  result  on dumping. In
sector  i of an economy,  firm  j  generates  real  profits  (rij).
(1)  -ij  Pi(qi)qij  - cjj(wjqjj)
qij  is the  output  per firm  and is sold  in the  home (hij)  and  foreign  (x")
markets.  cjj  is the total  cost  of production  per  firm.  ci(.)  is an
increasing  function  of the  economy-wide  wage  w, reflecting  the optimal  use of labor  by the sector. It is increasing  at a decreasing  rate  in q.j  if
technology  is governed  by decreasing  costs,  and  at an increasing  rate  if the
technology  has the  increasing-cost  property. PL  is the  price  of the final
good. Aggregate  quantities  qt,  hi  and  xi  are  the  summations  over  firms  j;
e.g.,  qi  - EJ  qij.
If there  is a single  market  for  its  output,  this firm  can  maximize  its
profits  by choosing  an output  level  that  will set  marginal  revenue  equal  to
marginal  cost.  This  can  be restated  in  mathematical  terms  as
(2)  Pi(G  + (1/6)) - mcij(w,qij).
The left-hand  side  of equation  (3)  is the  marginal  revenue  of additional
output  with 6  the  price  elasticity  of demand  for  the  product  perceived  by the
firm.  mcij  is the  marginal  cost of  producing  that  extra  output  (equal  to the
derivative  of cij  with respect  to qi,). 6  will be negative,  and  Pi  will thus
exceed  mc% 1. A natural  definition  of the  elasticity  of demand  is based  upon
aggregate  home  (h.)  ard  foreign  (xi)  sales  of the  sector-i  good  and  the  price
elasticities  of aggregate  demand  At,  A4.
(3)  6  =-  A  ((qi-xi)/qi)  Ah + (x1/q,)  A.
The  Viner/Robinson  insight  is that  if  Ab  and  A.  are different,  then  the
marginal  revenues  from sales  to the two  markets  will  be different. The firm
will gain  if it can segment  the  market  and sell  its  good  for  different  prices
in the two  markets. In this case  equation  (2)  is replaced  by separate
conditions  of  marginal  revenue  and  marginal  cost in the  firm's  two  markets,
with P, and  Ph.  the  prices  charged  in  the two  markets.
(4a)  Phi(l  + (i/Ah))  - mcij(w,qij).
(4b)  Pj(l + (1/A4))  - mcj(w,qj).
Dumping  is  profit-enhancing  when foreign  demand  is  more  price-elastic  than
domestic  demand  (Ab >  A.). This  can  be seen  through  an expansion  of the
profit  function  and  insertion  of  mcij  from  equation  (2):
(5)  dir  - P1(l+(1/4.))  dxij  + Pi(l+(lI/A))  dhj
- mc 1j(w,q±j)(dh 1 j  + dx 1j)
-1st((/A4)-(1/A))  dxj + (1^)1/)  dhj
- P1((1/bAA)(A  - A.)  dx 1 j  +  (1/Mb)(A  - ah)  dh±j
The  firm  can  enhance  its  profits  above  those  of  the  non-segmented  case  by
expanding  output  in the  market  segment  with the  more elastic  demand  (here,  the
export  market)  and contracting  output  in the  market  segment  with less elastic
demand.export  market)  and contracting  output  in the  market  segment  with less  elastic
demand.
Analyses  of dumping  have  extended  this  understanding  of profit-
maximizing  behavior  by recognizing  that  the  perceived  elasticity  of demand  6
is dependent  upon  market  structure. When a firm  must share  its  market  with
other  firms,  its  perception  of the  price  elasticity  of demand  for its  product
6  will differ  from  the  market  elasticity  A.  For a  mono olistic  firm,
equations  (4)  would  be appropriate,  but the  perceived  elasticities  of demand
for  oligopolistic  firms  will be greater  in  absolute  value.  We follow  Dixit
(1988)  in examining  a small  number  n1 of symmetric  firms  and in  measuring
their  interactions  through  a conjectural  variations  parameter. The  profit-
maximizing  choice  of the  non-discriminating  oligopolist  will be governed  by an
adjusted  version  of the  marginal  revenue-marginal  cost  condition  of equation
(2).
(6)  Pi(1  - V1(1/A))  - mcij(w,qij)
V  is the  coefficient  of conjectural  variation  and  indicates  the  extent  to
which the individual  firm  anticipates  that  other  firms  will respond  to its
choice  of qj.  The  Vi  is defined  as in  Dixit (1988)  for  the  domestic  market  as
(7)  Vi  - [1  + (nu  - l)vbl  + n.: 1 v 3±]/nb -
n1 , is the  number  of foreign  firms  competing  in  home sector  i.  vu is the
conjectured  quantity  response  of other  domestic  firms  to a unit increase  in
output  by one  firm and  v 1 is the  conjectured  quantity  response  of foreign
firms  to a unit increase  in output  by one  domestic  firm.  The interactions  of
these  firms  can  be described  in  a number  of  ways, and  as Eaton  and  Grossman
(1986)  point  out  the results  obtained  may  be sensitive  to the  method  chosen.
We choose  to employ  the  conditions  of a Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  where  vu -
v.,  - 0 so that  V,  - 1/nh.  The  perceived  price  elasticity  of demand  for
each firm  is then  6h - nbah  and is larger  in absolute  value  than the
corresponding  market  elasticitv.
The  dumping  firm  will be able  to discriminate  between  competition  in the
domestic  market  and  competition  in the foreign  market.  Its  pricing  policies
will then  differ  by  market-,  and  can  be described  by a  variant  of equations
(4).
(8a)  Ph(1 + (116)) :  mc"(w,qij),  6h - nhi
(8b)  P1(1 + (1/E6))  - mcLj(w,qlj),  6.  - nt4
This  will lead to  behavior  more closely  approximating  competition  than  in the
monopolistic  case,  but  will still  leave  the  wedge  between  price  and  marginal
cost that  induces  welfare  losses. Combination  of these  yields  the  wedge
between  Pu  and  Pd given  in the  text.  Dumping  will as before  occur  when
foreign  demand  is perceived  to be more  price-elastic  than  domestic  demand  (6h
c 6 ); this  could  be due  to differences  in  market  elasticities  or in the
numter  of firms  in the  target  market. It  will  be profit-enhancing  for
reasoning  similar  to that  illustrated  in  equation  (5).
For  dumping  to be welfare-improving,  the increased  profits  due  to
foreign  sales  must exceed  the  welfare  losses  due  to higher  domestic  prices.
(9)  n,  - sJ(hL)  - P1(hi)  hi  + 
with s1(h 1) - f  hi(u)  du
0and  P,(h,)  the domestic  inverse  demand  function  for  h  . If the  benchmark  case
is,  as  'bove, one  in  which  no segmentation  is possible,  the change  in sector-i
welfare  due  to dumping  is
(10)  dMt  - Pi  dh - P  (1-(1/16))  dh,  + dw,
- P,  dh,  +  P,(1/66.)(6  - 6.)  dx,
The first  term on the  right-hand  side  of equation  (10)  is the  lose  in
consumer  surplus  due  to the  reduction  in sales  to the  home  market (dh,  <  0).
The  second  term  indicates  the  Viner/Robinson  insight,  for  if the  perceived
price  elasticity  of demand  in the foreign  market  is greater  in absolute  value
(E,  < 6) then dumping  will have  a positive  profit  (and  welfare)  effect.
In the country  receiving  the dumped  goods  there  is  a corresponding
tendency  to reduced  profits  and increased  welfare  from sector  i relative  to
the  benchmark  case  of no market  segmentation.  The analysis  is analogous  to
that  outlined  above;  we state  below  the  mathematical  expressions  evaluated  at
x,  - 0.
(11)  dirf,  - (Pfi/qfi)6.  dx 1
(12)  dff,  - (-1/6E)  dx,
Profits  fall in the  importing  country  due  to the fall  in price  occasioned  by
dumping. Welfare  there  rises,  by contrast,  for consumer  surplus  rises  by  more
than the  fall in  profits.
AD Duties
When the  temporal  and  causal  link  between  AD duties  is  weak or
uncertain,  the  eventual  or uncertain  imposition  of AD duties  will not change
the  firms'  optimal  conditions  (8). However,  the  credible  threat  of an  AD duty
exactly  offsetting  the dumping  margin  will alter  firm  behavior  in the  export
market.
1.  Dumping,  according  to the  GATT,  could  also  be selling  below  cost  in the
export  market  even  if the same  is accurring  in the  domestic  market. See
Deardorff  (1988)  for  more detail.
2.  In a Cournot-Nash  equilibrium  each  actor  assumes  that  his competitors'
choice  will not respond  to any change  in his  own choice. Dixit (1986)
provides  a useful  discussion  of alternative  equilibrium  concepts.
3.  In game-theoretic  terminology,  with the  Type  I  AD duty  the  exporting
firms  have Cournot-Nash  conjectures  about  government  imposition: they
anticipate  no use of  AD duties  in  reaction  to their  decision  to dump.  With
the  Type II  AD duty the  government  has  made a credible  commitment  beforehand,
perhaps  through  legislation,  that it  will promptly  and completely  counteract
any  dumping  activity. The  government  thus  has a "Stackelberg  leader"
position,  with the firms  behaving  as "Stackelberg  followers"  in internalizing
the  government's  credible  commitment.
4.  If this coordination  also  led  to collusion  in the  domestic  market  there
would be  monopoly  pricing  there  as  well.
5.  For example,  export  demands  in single-country  models  are specified  in an
ad hoc fashion  that  may imply  unrealistic  parameters  of demand  for  imports  in
the  trading  partner.6.  We have performed  the  following  simulation  exercises  as  well for  trade
between  two  countries  in the  absence  of the  third  region. Those  results  are
available  on request.
7.  These  relative  prices  are 1.76  in  country  B vs.  2.79 in country  A.  It is
more precise  when looking  at global  welfare  to examine  the  relative  marginal
costs  of  production,  since  the  relative  price  of Ti in the  two  countries  is
perhaps  dependent  upon the  industrial  policy  limiting  the  number  of firms.
Comparative  advantage  is revealed  more starkly  through  that  comparison: .88
in country  A vs. 1.39  in country  B.
8.  We will not  observe  fractions  of firms  in the  market. We provide  the
exact (if  fractional)  number  of firms  that  would  provide  zero  profits,  but it
is  more realistic  to assume  that  the  equilibrium  number  of firms  in the  two
markets  would be 6 and 3, respectively,  with firms  that  entered  these  markets
reaping  small  positive  profits.PRE  Working  Paper  Series
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